Public regulation is compatible with Georgism. Sure, in that sense, the public can and should have some negative control rights on the overall management of land.
The public’s control cannot extend to complete control without hollowing out the notion of workplace democracy. Workers’ collectives have to have some partial rights to control land relevant to their operations as well for there to be workers’ self-management
It is not agreeable for any group to use any plot of land for any purpose that is beneficial to members of the group. Further, it would not be beneficial to a group generally to use land outside of some system of more general planning, for proximity to other buildings, resources, and infrastructure Agreements must be negotiated through some general process of land management.
As I earlier explained, Georgism tends not to provide any further value, or solve to any unresolved problem, for leftist tendencies.
Why is it not agreeable for any group to use land for purposes that is beneficial to the members of the group? I don’t see how you could have workplace democracy without this. Of course, the workers in an enterprise are going to use their democratic control rights to make decisions that benefit them.
Sure, there has to be some sort of urban planning and regulations on land use. That is perfectly compatible with Georgism
Urban planning and land allocation are required for resolving which group may use which land, and which usage is permitted.
Otherwise, conflict would be intractable, and exchange and transportation would be dysfunctional.
If land is managed cooperatively, then once a group is allocated use of land, it may proceed with use, but the public still holds an interest in broader supervision, and in cases of revised planning or observed mismanagement, reallocation may be warranted.
Land value taxation actually solves the mismanagement problem because as the location site-value increases the workers using the land have to pay more. This gives them an economic incentive to use the land more productively in order to afford the higher land rent
The public interest in managing land is not limited to assessing how much revenue is generated from its use, nor necessarily strongly bound to such considerations.
Public regulation is compatible with Georgism. Sure, in that sense, the public can and should have some negative control rights on the overall management of land.
The public’s control cannot extend to complete control without hollowing out the notion of workplace democracy. Workers’ collectives have to have some partial rights to control land relevant to their operations as well for there to be workers’ self-management
Land allocation must to be managed.
It is not agreeable for any group to use any plot of land for any purpose that is beneficial to members of the group. Further, it would not be beneficial to a group generally to use land outside of some system of more general planning, for proximity to other buildings, resources, and infrastructure Agreements must be negotiated through some general process of land management.
As I earlier explained, Georgism tends not to provide any further value, or solve to any unresolved problem, for leftist tendencies.
Why is it not agreeable for any group to use land for purposes that is beneficial to the members of the group? I don’t see how you could have workplace democracy without this. Of course, the workers in an enterprise are going to use their democratic control rights to make decisions that benefit them.
Sure, there has to be some sort of urban planning and regulations on land use. That is perfectly compatible with Georgism
Urban planning and land allocation are required for resolving which group may use which land, and which usage is permitted.
Otherwise, conflict would be intractable, and exchange and transportation would be dysfunctional.
If land is managed cooperatively, then once a group is allocated use of land, it may proceed with use, but the public still holds an interest in broader supervision, and in cases of revised planning or observed mismanagement, reallocation may be warranted.
Land value taxation actually solves the mismanagement problem because as the location site-value increases the workers using the land have to pay more. This gives them an economic incentive to use the land more productively in order to afford the higher land rent
The public interest in managing land is not limited to assessing how much revenue is generated from its use, nor necessarily strongly bound to such considerations.